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ABSTRACT 
South African households live in an environment characterized by risks, and 
many face a significant probability of experiencing economic losses that threaten their 
daily subsistence. Using household panel data that include directly solicited information 
on economic shocks and employing household fixed-effects estimation, we explore how 
well households cope with shocks by examining the effects of shocks on child nutritional 
status. Unlike in the idealized village community, some households appear unable to 
insure against risk, particularly when others in their communities simultaneously suffer 
large losses. Households in communities with more social capital, however, seem better 
able to weather shocks.  
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1. Introduction 
Using South African household panel data that include directly solicited 
information on economic shocks, this paper explores three questions:  
1.  Which households are able to cope with economic shocks? 
2.  Is it more difficult for households to cope with covariant as opposed to 
idiosyncratic shocks? 
3.  Do households enjoy access to ￿social capital￿ that facilitates their capacity to 
cope with either type of shock? 
To address these questions, we exploit research that shows that malnutrition 
occurring from the prenatal period to age 3 permanently affects the growth of young 
children. Economic losses that destabilize household consumption and result in 
malnutrition over the inter-survey period would therefore be captured by nutritional 
status measures taken in the second survey round. By examining height-for-age Z-scores 
of young children, then, we are looking for indirect evidence of failed consumption 
smoothing that was particularly costly in terms of child welfare. 
There is increasing evidence that risk-averse households seek to smooth their 
consumption in the face of fluctuating incomes. Less certain, however, is their capacity to 
do so in the absence of the full and complete markets that would permit them to either 
purchase insurance in anticipation of shocks or borrow against future earnings to smooth 
consumption in the wake of realized economic losses. Of course, even in the absence of 
insurance markets and the presence of binding borrowing constraints, households may be   2
able to smooth consumption through a variety of nonmarket and self-insurance 
mechanisms. Townsend (1994), for example, demonstrates that local communities can 
and do mutually insure themselves against idiosyncratic income fluctuations. Deaton 
(1991) suggests that by following a simple precautionary savings strategy, individual 
households can self-insure against covariant shocks, or any other kind of economic loss, 
and achieve relatively smooth consumption. 
While these arguments are compelling in their implication that the welfare losses 
associated with incomplete markets may be modest, they have been questioned on both 
empirical and theoretical grounds.
1 In weakly diversified, weather-dependent economies, 
covariant risk can be an important source of overall income instability (Carter 1997). 
Moreover, poor households are not always able to manage shocks autonomously through 
self-insurance (Jalan and Ravallion 1999). Therefore, the ability of households to use 
informal insurance mechanisms to manage both idiosyncratic and covariant shocks 
becomes critical.  
The available evidence suggests that informal insurance functions most 
effectively for idiosyncratic shocks. A plausible explanation for this finding comprises 
two parts. The first is that the links necessary to assure informal insurers that their actions 
will be reciprocated in the future is tightly circumscribed geographically. In other 
language, the social capital needed to secure informal insurance is localized 
geographically, where social capital is broadly defined as networks, norms, and trust that 
                                                 
1 Factors that limit household capacity to smooth consumption include state-dependent discounting, 
subsistence constraints, and competing uses of capital (Zimmerman and Carter 2002).   3
enhance the incentive compatibility of noncontractual or legally unenforceable exchange. 
The second is that households willing to informally insure one another share similar 
livelihoods and living standards. A covariant shock that strikes all households would 
leave all in similarly dire straits with little possibility for (intertemporal) arbitrage 
between households with low and high post-shock marginal utility of consumption. The 
presumption would appear to be that social capital is highly localized in socioeconomic 
terms and exists only between households that share similar socioeconomic identities. 
While the notion that social capital is highly localized is appealing, the literature 
has identified a different form of social capital, known as bridging social capital, that 
cuts across geographic and socioeconomic distance (Narayan 1999). The existence of 
bridging social capital might enable informal insurance mechanisms to help households 
cope with covariant economic shocks.
2 Conversely, its absence would signal the 
problematic exposure of households to covariant shocks, especially those households that 
find self-insurance too costly to obtain. Exclusion from bridging social capital might be 
most severe in societies where class, social identity, and area of residence are all highly 
correlated. South Africa would appear to be a prime example of a society where bridging 
social capital is costly to construct, and therefore where covariant shocks are likely to 
weigh heavily on the coping capacity of poor households. 
 
 
                                                 
2 Church groups that create linkages across space and economic class would be one example of bridging 
social capital that could help households smooth consumption in the wake of a community-wide shock.   4
2. Growth of Young Children as an Indicator of Coping Capacity 
Much of the literature on the effect of shocks on the economic well-being of 
households focuses on consumption (Townsend 1995; Jacoby and Skoufias 1998) and, 
sometimes, income smoothing (Morduch 1995). Examining smoothing is particularly 
powerful when considering the effects of recent events using, for example, annual or 
even higher frequency data. For longer time periods, such as in the household panel data 
we analyze with two observations five years apart, a similar analysis would be much less 
informative because the effects of shocks might be dampened substantially. Of course, 
another equally important area to investigate related to current consumption smoothing is 
past consumption smoothing, i.e., the effects and persistence of shocks, even transitory 
ones, that have occurred in the more distant past.  
Given time lags and the various mechanisms identified in the literature for 
smoothing, however, it is likely to be difficult to detect long-term effects of shocks on 
end-of-period consumption in the South African data we examine. Therefore, we take a 
different approach, investigating the effect of shocks on a long-term indicator of human 
capital, child height-for-age Z-scores standardized for age and gender, using the U.S. 
National Center for Health Statistics norms. This approach provides a conservative test of 
consumption smoothing, since households are likely to protect the nutritional status of 
their young children as a result of the potentially serious long-term consequences, 
including mortality, of not doing so. In some measure, it is also a more sharply focused 
test than one that examines overall consumption, since consumption comprises a mix of   5
many imperfectly measured components, all with attendant biases that may distort the 
test. Finally, since declines in nutritional status for young children today translate into 
lower levels of human capital, and thus economic development, in the future, it is also a 
test of the persistent effects resulting from failures of consumption-smoothing efforts. 
The narrow focus of the test necessitates careful interpretation when we fail to 
reject the null hypothesis that the observed shocks had no effect on child nutritional 
status. Failure to reject should not be construed as evidence in favor of general 
consumption smoothing, but only of a capacity to smooth with respect to child nutritional 
status. In other words, the test will not detect breakdowns in consumption smoothing that 
did not affect the child. 
Our approach is similar to that of Dercon and Krishnan (2000), who characterize 
the capacity of individuals in rural Ethiopian households to smooth consumption by 
examining how individual, household, and aggregate shocks impinge on adult nutritional 
status. They find that poorer households are unable to smooth consumption during the 
year, and members￿ nutritional status, as measured by body mass index, varies 
significantly. Because of the relationship between increased consumption and economic 
productivity, however, examining adults is probably more difficult than examining 
children.  
To describe the test we implement, we first briefly explain the nutritional science 
underlying it. In large part because they are growing so fast, young children have high 
nutritional requirements. At the same time, they are also susceptible to infections, 
because their immature immune systems fail to protect them adequately. As a result,   6
malnutrition is most common and severe in utero and during the first few years of 
childhood (UNICEF 1998).
 One aspect of early malnutrition is increased mortality 
(Pelletier et al. 1995). Another is that growth failure occurs primarily in utero and in the 
first three years of life and causes short stature of adults (Martorell et al. 1995). Research 
in economics identifies the significant role of childhood nutrition in other outcomes as 
well, including educational achievement and cognitive abilities (Alderman et al. 2001a, 
Glewwe and King 2001).  
Those early years, then, represent a particularly vulnerable period for children, 
after which it is more difficult to alter a child￿s growth trajectory. Our estimation strategy 
will exploit these underlying biological relationships and focus on the effects of 
economic shocks on children during that vulnerable period. We match retrospective 
information on household losses and gains during the previous five years to the period of 
vulnerability for each child under 5 in 1998. The most vulnerable periods are shown in 
Figure 1. A child who is 1 year old in 1998 is vulnerable during that year and also for a 
large portion of 1997, the period corresponding to her prenatal development (shaded a 
lighter gray). Similarly, a child who is 2 years old in 1998 is vulnerable in 1997￿1998 
and part of 1996.  
Based on the scheme presented in Figure 1, for each child we characterize the 
environment of positive and negative events during a child￿s susceptible period as 
follows. First we calculate the real value of all negative and positive shocks separately for 
each household for each year between the survey rounds (this is described in detail in the 
Retrospective Measurement discussion in Section 3). A child aged 1 in 1998, then, was   7
vulnerable in 1997 and 1998, so we associate the average annual loss (gain) of the child￿s 
household for 1997 and 1998 with that child. Her older sibling aged 5 in 1998, although 
living in the same household, was most vulnerable in an earlier period, from 1993 to 
1996. These differential exposure periods by siblings within the same households enable 
us to control for all time-invariant household-level factors in the estimation. 
 
Figure 1￿Age-vulnerable periods for children from conception to age three 
  Age of child in 1998 
Event year  1  2  3  4  5 
1998          
1997           
1996           
1995         
1994         
1993         
 
3. Characterizing the Stochastic Environment Faced by 
Households in KwaZulu-Natal 
The KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study 
In order to explore the capacity of households to cope with economic shocks, we 
use a panel survey of South African households. The first round of the survey was 
undertaken in the last half of 1993 (PSLSD 1994) at the national level. South Africa has 
experienced dramatic political, social, and economic change since the democratic 
national elections in 1994. With the aim of addressing policy research questions 
concerning how these changes were affecting South Africans, African and Indian   8
households in KwaZulu-Natal Province were resurveyed in March￿June 1998 for the 
KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study (KIDS) (May et al. 2000).  
Formed by combining the former Zulu homeland and Natal Province, KwaZulu-
Natal is now South Africa￿s largest province, containing one-fifth of the country￿s 
population of approximately 41 million. Though not South Africa￿s poorest province, 
about two-fifths of its residents live in poverty (Carter and May 2001). It is also 
ethnically diverse: 82 percent of the population are African (and nearly all of these Zulu), 
10 percent Indian, 7 percent white, and 1 percent coloured. During the mid-1980s and 
again in the early 1990s, there was substantial political unrest and violence in KwaZulu-
Natal, which makes the province an especially interesting place to study the relationship 
between economic shocks and social capital.  
In 1993, the KwaZulu-Natal sample was representative at the provincial level and 
contained 1,354 African and Indian households. Of the target sample, 1,132 households 
(84 percent) were successfully reinterviewed in 1998, success being defined as having 
reinterviewed at least one adult member from the 1993 household (Maluccio 2001). This 
rate of attrition is on par with or below those of similar studies in developing countries. 
To ensure comparability, the 1998 household questionnaire largely followed the 
1993 version, an integrated household survey similar in design to a World Bank Living 
Standards Measurement Survey that included, among other things, measures of 
demographic structure, household income and expenditures, and anthropometric 
measures for children age 6 and under. In addition, a number of new modules were   9
introduced, the most important of which for this paper is the section on surprise economic 
events or shocks experienced by the households. 
 
Retrospective Measurement of ￿Random￿ Losses and Gains 
In the so-called shocks module, households were asked to report whether any of a 
set of events identified through pretesting had occurred ￿by surprise￿ during the five-year 
reference period. Negative economic events included things affecting individuals within 
or connected to the household (e.g., death, serious injury, illness, loss of a job), declines 
in resource flows to the household (e.g., cutoff or decline in private remittances or 
government grants), and property losses suffered by the household (e.g., theft, crop 
failure, loss of livestock, business failure). 
A key innovation in the module developed for the KIDS was that it goes beyond a 
mere accounting of the number and type of events that occurred; rather, it attempts to 
assign a value to the economic loss they caused. For each event that occurred, the 
household provides the following information: (1) the year it occurred; (2) how long it 
lasted in months; (3) the monthly decline in household income; (4) the total once-off 
expenditures; and (5) the value of items lost.  
Another innovation of the shocks module was a section designed to avoid the 
asymmetry of considering only negative events by asking about positive ones. Potential 
positive events included the obvious counterparts to some of the negative events 
described above (e.g., new job, new or increased remittances or government grants) as   10
well as others, such as retirement payouts from firms, inheritances, large gifts, and 
scholarships. 
Table 1 provides the frequency distribution of the various events reported for the 
1,132 households. The top panel shows that the most common reported event is death, 
followed by serious illness or injury, the loss of a job, and theft, fire, or the destruction of 
property. On average, households reported slightly more than one negative event each. 
The bottom panel shows that far fewer positive events were reported over the period, 
about one-third of an event, on average, per household. Over half of the positive events 
are a new job; it turns out that about one-quarter of those who report losing a job 
subsequently report getting a new one. While 70 percent of the households report at least 
one negative event and 30 percent report at least one positive event, fully 25 percent do  
 
Table 1￿Economic events in the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study (KIDS) 
1993￿1998 
Events Frequency  Percent 
Negative     
  Death of household member or family member    431    32.2 
  Serious illness or injury     241    18.0 
  Loss of job    228    17.0 
  Theft, fire, or destruction of property    180    13.4 
  Death or disease of livestock    97    7.2 
  Major crop failure    62    4.6 
  Other    101    7.6 
    Total negative events    1,340    100.0 
Positive    
  New job    210    53.2 
  Increased grant or pension    60    15.2 
  Firm payment    38    9.6 
  Increased remittances    35    8.9 
  Inheritance    18    4.6 
  Other    34    8.5 
    Total positive events    395    100.0 
   11
not report an event of either type over the five years. Those households reporting both 
negative and positive events may be living in riskier circumstances than those that report 
neither. 
An examination of the distribution of events by race indicates only a few 
differences between Africans and Indians. Indian households, which are almost 
exclusively located in urban areas, rarely suffer agricultural-related negative events. 
Indians are also very unlikely to report increased remittances or government grants, 
though they are somewhat more likely to report payouts from firms, reflecting their closer 
integration with the formal economy.  
To construct measures for the value of gains and losses utilized in this paper, we 
start by aggregating the flow of reported losses and, separately, gains due to different 
events in each year for each household. We do not combine gains and losses, allowing us 
to explore whether positive and negative flows have symmetric effects. In a hypothetical 
example of a serious illness by a household member reported in 1994 that lasted 24 
months and had an associated one-time expenditure of 1,000 rand (R) and monthly 
income loss of R100, we would calculate the household level loss as follows: we first 
assume that the event occurred in the middle of the year and assign the one-time 
expenditure of R1,000 and six months of the monthly income loss to 1994 
(6 × R100 + R1,000 = R1,600), 12 months of the monthly income loss to 1995 (R1,200), 
and the final six months of income loss to 1996 (R600).    12
As a second hypothetical example, consider the death of a household member. In 
this instance, the reported once-off losses are the out-of-pocket expenses for the funeral 
and related services. If the deceased had an income, this would not be captured directly, 
as the calculated loss likely represents a lower bound estimate. It should be apparent from 
these two simple examples that valuing the economic events and apportioning their costs 
and benefits are inexact exercises subject to measurement errors. This is a theme we 
return to in the empirical analysis. 
Another measurement concern is possible retrospective reporting bias. For 
example, if households were more likely to report recent or more severe events, this 
could bias inferences made using the reported data. When long-term recall is required, 
accuracy is increased if the information is related to some salient event or period in the 
respondent￿s life. In South Africa, it is certain that one of the most important events in 
recent history was the 1994 national democratic election that brought the African 
National Congress and President Nelson Mandela to power. Since the 1993 survey was 
undertaken about six months prior to these elections, interviewers were trained in 1998 to 
introduce retrospective questions relating to 1993 with the phrase ￿in the year before the 
first democratic national elections.￿ Thus, a priori, the retrospective data are likely to be 
accurate.  
Examining the annual reporting patterns, there does appear to be a tendency for 
higher frequency reports in later years. While this is possible in an increasingly uncertain 
environment where, for example, unemployment was increasing, there is also the 
possibility that it represents a bias toward reporting easier-to-remember, i.e., more recent,   13
events. At the same time, and consistent with complete reporting, there are fewer events 
reported in the 1993 and 1998 periods, which each covered less than a full year. In 
addition, evidence from an independently collected cluster or community (hereafter 
community) survey corroborates the observed annual reporting pattern. Nevertheless, 
given the higher number of reported events in 1996￿1997, some of the analyses that 
follow will focus on the more recent events in order to sidestep recall problems.  
After calculating loss and gain measures for each household in each year from 
1993 to 1998, we next explore how to measure what was happening to neighboring 
households in the community. First, for each household we calculate the average losses 
and gains for neighboring households in the community, excluding the household itself. 
We call these neighbors￿ average losses and gains. Second, to the extent possible, analogs 
to the household-level questions on positive and negative events were asked in 67 
community-level surveys, which were completed by interviewing key informants in the 
community. Some of the possible events included weather or crop-related problems, 
changes in community services or major employers, and changes in community 
leadership. For each event indicated, in addition to the timing and duration, the 
proportion of the community affected and the severity of the effects were reported. Thus, 
while it is not possible to estimate the value of the losses or gains associated with these 
events, one can go beyond a mere accounting of the events.  
The independently collected community information can serve both as a check on 
the household information and as a measure of aggregate shocks at the community level 
to use as an alternative to the average neighbors￿ shocks. These data are particularly   14
useful since in four of the communities, there were fewer than 10 households interviewed 
in 1998, so the information from other households is less likely to be representative of the 
geographic community. It is also useful because the community-level information will in 
part reflect a different set of shocks. We utilize both the household- and community-level 
information on events in the empirical analysis. 
 
The Magnitude and Stochastic Structure of Economic Vulnerability 
While there is a tendency to describe economic shocks as either idiosyncratic or 
covariant, the line between these two archetypal shocks quickly becomes blurred in real-
world economies. Using the measures of own and neighbors￿ shocks, we can begin to 
explore both the magnitude of risk confronting households in KwaZulu-Natal as well as 
the covariance between their shocks and those of their neighbors who potentially stand 
ready to help them in times of need. The analysis in this section will focus on the degree 
and stochastic structure of vulnerability created by the risk of economic loss.
3 This 
vulnerability is likely to be especially important to the 40 percent of the KIDS households 
below the poverty line (Carter and May 2001).  
Figure 2 presents the empirical cumulative distributions for economic losses 
experienced by individual households in the KIDS sample as well as the average loss 
experienced by their neighbors. To create these distributions, total economic losses for 
each household (and its neighbors) were calculated for the final 39 months covered by the 
                                                 
3 We will refer only briefly to a parallel analysis of the distribution of positive shocks. Complete details of 
the analysis of positive shocks are available from the authors.   15
retrospective shock module of the KIDS survey and converted into a monthly equivalent. 
This 39-month span approximates the period of prenatal and early growth nutritional 
vulnerability that will be used to structure the analysis in the subsequent section. In 
addition, it includes only the more recent, and possibly more reliably reported, events. To 
characterize the magnitude and meaning of vulnerability in the sample, we first examine 
the marginal or unconditional distribution of economic losses on the presumption that  
 
 
Figure 2￿Marginal distributions of economic losses 
















































   16
exposure to loss is independent of other household characteristics. Later in this section 
we present the conditional distribution of vulnerability. 
As can be seen from the dashed curve in Figure 2, some 44 percent of households 
reported no economic losses over this period. The overall mean loss in the sample 
(including households without a loss) is equivalent to a monthly income reduction of R95 
in 1998. The overall mean loss figure represents, on average, 5 percent of 1993 real 
average monthly expenditures; for only those households that experienced a loss, the 
average impact is nearly 10 percent. The distribution of economic losses is skewed, with 
an approximately 20 percent probability of a loss that is at least twice the average loss of 
R95 per month.
4 
In the wake of an economic loss in which households were unable to fully smooth 
consumption, we would expect relatively well-off households to cut discretionary 
spending rather than cut the care of children. In order to get a sense of the likelihood of 
losses that might push households into a range where child nutrition must be sacrificed, 
we calculated a subsistence cushion for each household. This cushion is defined as the 
difference between the household￿s total expenditures in 1993, our proxy for permanent 
income, and the household￿s subsistence needs.
5 The two vertical dotted lines in Figure 2 
show the subsistence cushion for the household at the second quintile and the median 
                                                 
4 The empirical cumulative distribution function for economic gains shows a 60 percent probability of no 
gain and a 17 percent chance of a gain in excess of R190 per month. 
5 Subsistence needs are calculated based on household demographics and the subsistence market basket of 
goods calculated by the Institute for Planning Research at the University of Port Elizabeth (Potgieter 1993a, 
1993b).   17
household, respectively.
6 The cushion for the household at the first quintile is negative 
(-R89 per month), indicating its expenditures are already below subsistence needs. 
For the median household, there is a 7 percent probability of an economic loss 
that would reduce current consumption below subsistence needs. For a household at the 
second quintile, that probability increases to about 15 percent, while households in the 
lower 30 percent of the distribution have a greater than 50 percent chance that an 
economic loss will cut further into their ability to meet subsistence needs. While it is hard 
to know at what level a household with consumption-smoothing difficulties may be 
forced to cut into child nutrition, these figures suggest that the households in the KIDS 
sample face a significant risk of such an event. 
The analysis to this point has failed to address the degree to which a household￿s 
own losses and those of its neighbors vary together. The presence of covariant risk might 
signal potential difficulties the household would face in relying on mutual aid or informal 
insurance to cope with economic losses. The solid curve in Figure 2 displays the 
empirical cumulative distribution of average losses experienced by neighbors. This 
distribution rises steeply and is much more compressed than the distribution for losses 
experienced by individual households. On its own, this suggests that the degree of 
covariance in losses is rather modest. 
The analysis has also naively assumed that risk of economic loss is similar for 
households irrespective of their level of well-being or the size of their subsistence 
                                                 
6 Median and quintiles are defined with respect to the distribution of cushion size.   18
cushion. To sharpen our understanding of loss exposure across different types of 
households and the impact of covariant risk, we estimate the conditional probability 
distribution of economic loss,  ) , | (
n
i i i x f l l , where  i l are the losses experienced by 
household, i, xi are conditioning characteristics of the household, and 
n
i l are the losses 
experienced by the neighbors of household i. Exploration of this conditional distribution, 
as opposed to the marginal distribution discussed above, will permit us to better 
characterize the distribution of vulnerability in the sample. To estimate the parameters of 
this distribution, we employ the following heteroscedastic Tobit specification for 




 > + +
=
otherwise
x if x i i i i
i , 0
0 ε β ε β
l , (1) 
where we assume that  ) , 0 ( ~ | 2
i i i N x σ ε  and that σi is a linear function of a subset of xi. 
We denote the heteroscedastic normal probability distribution function as  ) | ( i x ε φ . 
Table 2 presents maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of equation 
(1).
7 As conditioning variables xi, we employ measures of  
•  conventional 1993 economic assets of educated labor, uneducated labor, and 
productive capital defined as the value of tools and equipment, land, and 
livestock; 
•  location, measured by a rural-urban dummy variable;  
                                                 
7 The estimates are based on 1,169 household-level observations reflecting the fact that some of the original 
1993 households that were reinterviewed had split, and interviews were carried out in each of the newly 
formed households (see May et al. 2000 for details).   19
•  dependence on remittances and social transfers, measured as total remittance and 
transfer income in 1993;  
•  well-being, measured as 1993 expenditures normalized by 1993 subsistence 
needs; 
•  neighbors￿ contemporaneous losses, measured by the average losses experienced 
by the household￿s neighbors. 
The variance is specified as a function of the well-being and location variables.  
 
Table 2￿Economic loss: Maximum likelihood estimates of heteroscedastic Tobit 
model 
Dependent variable: Economic loss (rand per month) 
Expected loss   
































Variance of loss   












N  1,169 
Notes: The ratio of the parameter to the standard error is given in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10 
percent, ** at 5 percent, and *** at 1 percent.   20
Expected economic loss increases with the 1993 stock of educated labor. Though 
insignificant at the usual levels, the point estimate on uneducated labor is nearly twice 
that of educated labor, suggesting that income from uneducated labor is more prone to 
loss than is income from educated labor. Initial productive capital has no significant 
effect on expected losses. High levels of remittances and transfer income increase 
expected losses, demonstrating significant variability in these income components. The 
results also show the importance of covariant risk: expected losses increase by R0.33 for 
every R1.00 increase in the average loss experienced by one￿s neighbors. Finally, 
expected loss decreases with well-being, an indication that poorer households appear to 
be more vulnerable. At the same time, however, the variance of losses increases with 
well-being, as well as in rural areas.
8  
Figure 3 displays the implications of these estimates for the pattern of 
vulnerability and covariant risk. Whereas Figure 2 presented the marginal or 
unconditional cumulative density for economic loss, Figure 3 displays conditional 
densities for different household profiles. Letting xj denote the values of the conditioning 
variables for household profile j, Figure 3 is constructed by using the maximum 
likelihood estimates to calculate 
 
                                                 
8 Econometric analysis of the distribution of economic gains yields broadly similar results. Expected gains 
decrease with permanent income, while the variance of gains increases with permanent income. Gains 
appear more highly correlated across households than losses, and, in general, the conditional variance in 
gains is much higher than for losses. In rural areas, where the variance in losses was relatively high, the 
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for each possible loss level l, shown on the horizontal axis.  
Ex ante, if we believe that the absolute risk faced by better-off households 
exceeds that faced by poorer households because the former have more to lose, we would 
expect the cumulative distribution for better-off households to stochastically dominate the 
distribution for poorer households (lying everywhere to the southeast of the distribution 
for poorer households). On the other hand, if we believe that poorer households occupy  
Figure 3￿Conditional distributions of economic losses 







































Figure 3. Conditional Distributions of Economic Losses
Poor Household, Low Neighbor Losses
Median Household
Poor Household, High Neighbor Losses
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less stable and more vulnerable economic niches, we would expect the opposite 
relationship. 
Figure 3 shows the conditional cumulative distributions for three different 
household profiles. The solid curve shows the cumulative distribution for a household 
that has the median value of all the conditioning variables. Probabilities are also shown 
for a poorer household located at the first quintile of the well-being distribution, with 
permanent income that is 89 percent of its subsistence needs. The dotted line shows the 
cumulative probabilities for this poor household when its neighbors experienced only 
mild losses (R30 per month, on average), while the dashed line shows probabilities for 
this same household when its neighbors suffered larger losses (R160).
9 
The first thing to note is that the mean and the variance effects of poverty on 
vulnerability are nearly offsetting. With low neighbor losses, the poor household has a 55 
percent probability of no economic loss, almost identical to that of the median household. 
The cumulative distribution for the median household stochastically dominates that for 
the poorer household in this circumstance, indicating lower absolute risk for the poorer 
household whose neighbors are doing well. 
When its neighbors, on average, have had hard times, however, that same poor 
household has only a 49 percent probability of no economic loss, five percentage points 
                                                 
9 These two loss figures respectively represent the values at the first and ninth deciles of the neighbors￿ 
average loss distribution.   23
below the median household.
10 Indeed in this circumstance, stochastic dominance breaks 
down and the poor household has higher probabilities of losses up to about R100 per 
month than does the median household. Reflecting the importance of covariant risk, the 
fact that its neighbors have also suffered larger losses increases the probability of a loss 
of R100 by seven percentage points. Given that the poor household already lacks 
permanent income to cover its basic needs, even a loss this small might be sufficient to 
threaten child nutrition.   
 
4. Social Capital and the Capacity to Cope With Idiosyncratic and 
Covariant Economic Shocks in KwaZulu-Natal 
The previous section suggests that a substantial proportion of KwaZulu-Natal 
households are indeed vulnerable to economic losses that represent a large portion of 
their permanent income and that could challenge their subsistence-level well-being. 
Therefore, even when protecting child nutritional status is of the highest priority, 
unforeseen losses may overwhelm a household￿s capacity to avoid detrimental effects on 
child nutritional status. At the same time, many other households face only a minimal 
probability of such so-called subsistence shocks. Their prevalence suggests it may be 
important to consider how the effects of losses and gains are conditioned by wealth; 
                                                 
10 While the shift in conditional probabilities is modest, the lack of strong positive covariance in the joint 
distribution of own and neighbors￿ losses does not mean that households and their neighbors never 
simultaneously suffer higher-than-average shocks. Even if the shocks were jointly normally distributed 
with zero covariance, we would expect 25 percent to suffer above-average shocks at the same time that 
their neighbors had above-mean shocks.   24
better-off households, for example, may be better able to self-insure, dampening any 
effects.  
The empirical strategy, set out in Section 2, involves contrasting outcomes for 
children under age 5 living in the same household, who were exposed to different 
economic losses and gains during their respective vulnerable periods, i.e., a household 
fixed-effects model. Thus the influences of all fixed factors in the household, such as 
permanent income and characteristics of the parents, as well as any unobservable fixed 
factors, are swept out of the regression.  
The key identification assumption is that there are no time- or child-varying 
unobservable factors that directly influence, or are correlated with, both child nutritional 
status and the economic events. To be sure, much changed in South Africa during the 
1990s, and many of those changes are not observed in the data, nor will they be included 
directly in the regressions considered here. For example, the dismantling of apartheid was 
accompanied by massive investments in public health and education infrastructure in an 
effort to make those services available to the majority of the population. National or 
provincial time-varying factors that directly affect child outcomes will, in general, 
influence outcomes of all children of similar ages and thus be largely captured by 
controls for age. When changes are specific to certain communities, e.g., the opening of a 
new health clinic, its effects would be correctly attributed to community-level shock 
measures. 
The more pernicious form of time-varying unobservables for this analysis is at the 
child or household level, possibly due to endogeneity of the reported shock information.   25
To this point, we have not addressed whether, and to what extent, the information 
gathered in the event modules should be treated as random shocks that are exogenous to 
the households (and communities). Our view is that this would be a strong assumption for 
some of the events reported on here. For example, it is probable that many of the events 
considered in the analysis did not come as a complete surprise to the household and some 
households may have prepared. Furthermore, even for those events that did come as a 
surprise, the reported measures of loss and gain may reflect the behavioral responses of 
the household. For example, while the total expenses for a funeral may have some largely 
fixed components, they may also reflect choices made by households based on their 
circumstances. Finally, some of the events reported may be correlated with other 
unobservable characteristics of the households or individuals within them.  
One example that helps us think about how to assess whether these concerns are 
biasing our analyses is that of an illness striking the household and leading to a death or 
loss due to illness of an adult and simultaneously the illness of the child, whose 
nutritional status would thereby be compromised. In this instance, it is possible to find a 
correlation between the reported economic loss and nutritional status of the child that is 
spurious or overstated compared to the true effect of only the economic loss. It is more 
difficult to imagine this sort of confounding factor for the other types of economic events 
reported, however, so to probe its importance we will explore what happens when we 
limit the estimation to events unrelated to death or illness. 
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Coping With Economic Losses 
In column 1 of Table 3, we present a base regression specification that includes 
only child-specific information. While very little of the overall variation is explained by 
these factors, they do explain approximately 5 percent of the within-household variation 
in height-for-age Z-scores and indicate that Z-scores deteriorate with age in the sample. 
Not only is this a common finding in the nutrition literature, it is also consistent with the  
 
Table 3￿The role of household and community losses and gains on stunting 
Dependent variable: 1998 height-for-age Z-score of child 
Child characteristics   
 (1)  Male  -0.0640  -0.0883  -0.1126  -0.0983 
 (0.4)  (0.6)  (0.7)  (0.6) 
 Age  in  1998  -0.2414  -0.2283  -0.1844  -0.0794 
 (1.0)  (0.9)  (0.8)  (0.3) 
  Age in 1998 squared  0.0096  0.0180  0.0086  -0.0076 
 (0.2)  (0.4)  (0.2)  (0.2) 
Household characteristics   
 Ln  (Loss)  -  -0.0658*  -0.0369  -0.0614* 
 (1.8)  (0.1)  (1.7) 
 Ln  (Gain)  -  0.1251**  0.8833***  0.8953*** 
 (2.0)  (2.6)  (2.6) 
 Ln  (Loss)  × Ln 1993 PCE   -  -  -0.0043  - 
 (0.1) 
 Ln  (Gain)  × Ln 1993 PCE  -  -  -0.1656**  -0.1674** 
 (2.2)  (2.3) 
Community characteristics    
  Neighbors￿ average loss × 1000  - -  -  0.0899 
   (0.3) 
  Neighbors￿ average gain × 1000  - -  -  -0.1477 
   (1.0) 
Constant -0.1656  -0.4500  -0.2067  -0.1733 
 (0.5)  (1.1)  (0.5)  (0.4) 










F-test all covariates  









N  716 716 716 716 
Notes: Household fixed-effects estimates. Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. * indicates 
significance at 10 percent, ** at 5 percent, and *** at 1 percent.   27
general improvements in nutritional status over the period. Comparing children under 3 
in both 1993 and 1998 from the KIDS sample, we find that there has been an increase in 
mean height-for-age Z-scores of nearly one-half of a standard deviation (from ￿1.2 to ￿
0.8), a large change indicating that younger children are faring better, possibly as a result 
of public investments in health infrastructure. Finally, there is little difference in the 
sample between boys and girls￿ nutritional outcomes; this is not surprising since gender 
discrimination is generally thought to be less pervasive in South Africa than in other parts 
of the world.  
In column 2, we introduce household-level losses and gains, measured in 
logarithms. Children who were in their vulnerable years during periods of losses in the 
household (holding gains constant) are nutritionally worse-off than those who were not. 
At the sample mean, a 1 percent increase in the loss leads to an approximately 10 percent 
decline in nutritional status as measured by height-for-age Z-scores. Conversely, children 
who were living in households that saw significant gains during their vulnerable years 
benefited from those gains. 
Because of the greater possibility of self-insurance for wealthier individuals, we 
expect that the roles of both losses and gains might be weakened somewhat for better-off 
households. The next regression (column 3) explores this possibility by interacting the 
logarithm of per capita expenditures in 1993, our proxy measure of permanent income, 
by the household loss and gain measures. While there is no evidence of a differential 
effect of losses by initial logarithmic per capita expenditures (and this finding is robust to 
various characterizations of the relationship), there is a strong interaction effect between   28
initial logarithmic per capita expenditures and the size of the gain. (Note that initial 
logarithmic per capita expenditure does not enter the regression on its own since it is 
unchanging across siblings in the household.) The evidence from the second column that 
gains have a positive effect on child nutritional status is weakened for those with higher 
initial per capita expenditures, consistent with the likelihood that their children are 
already nutritionally secure. At the sample mean, however, the effect remains positive. In 
the regressions that follow, we include only the (significant) positive interaction. 
 
Coping with Covariant Shocks 
Next we address the role of community-level or covariant shocks. As described 
earlier, there are two formulations we can consider in the empirical work: (1) calculations 
of neighbors￿ losses and gains and (2) nonmonetary measures of aggregate shocks from 
the community-level survey. While there is overlap between the two measures, it is 
important to note that they are also likely to pick up different components of the risk 
structure in communities. For example, changes in infrastructure would be included in the 
second measure but not the first. We present results using the former measure (described 
in the previous section) and briefly discuss whether there are differences when we use the 
latter measure, as well as what happens when we include both.  
Column 4 in Table 3 shows that neighbor measures have little effect on the 
household-level outcomes after controlling for the household-level losses and gains. In 
addition, when only neighbors￿ losses and gains are included and not the household-level 
ones, the former remain insignificant (results not shown). A variety of specifications have   29
been considered, including logarithmic transformations of these measures as well as the 
community-survey-based measures including severity of the shocks; all leave the basic 
results unchanged. Without considering other conditioning factors, such as social capital, 
it would appear that household-level shocks dominate. In the context of the literature on 
informal insurance, this suggests that households are unable to protect fully against 
idiosyncratic shocks, but at the same time they are relatively unaffected by the aggregate 
shocks in their communities, as we have measured them. Of course, it may also be 
possible that communities in South Africa are not as well delineated geographically as in 
other places where clear village boundaries prevail￿implying that the shocks are 
measured with error.  
 
Social Capital and Coping with Shocks 
The existence of informal insurance mechanisms in certain areas is related to how 
closely linked people are in those places. Indeed, much of the literature on consumption 
smoothing focuses on rural communities, which are often more closely integrated than 
urban ones. When the above estimations are limited to the roughly 80 percent of rural 
respondents in the child sample, however, the results are unchanged. An alternative 
approach to exploring this hypothesis is to consider proxy measures of how well 
integrated various communities are, in order to explore whether the effects of shocks 
differ in areas that appear to be more or less integrated. In related research using these 
data, it has been shown that an important determinant of household welfare, as measured 
by per capita expenditures, is household membership in groups, a proxy for social capital   30
(Maluccio, Haddad, and May 2000). Here we take a similar approach and explore 
whether the initial number of groups and informal associations in communities in 1993 (a 
proxy measure for the social capital in the community and also across communities since 
the groups are not exclusively local) conditions the effect of losses at the household level. 
The results are presented in Table 4. 
 
Table 4￿The role of community groups on stunting 
Dependent variable: 1998 height-for-age Z-score of child 
Child characteristics 
 (1)  Male  -0.0982  -0.0780  -0.0750  -0.0303 
 (0.6)  (0.5)  (0.5)  (0.2) 
 Age  in  1998  -0.0916  -0.1304  -0.1546  -0.1993 
 (0.4)  (0.5)  (0.6)  (0.8) 
  Age in 1998 squared  -0.0059  0.0015  0.0050  0.0144 
 (0.1)  (0.0)  (0.1)  (0.3) 
Household characteristics 
 Ln  (Loss)  -0.0623*  -0.0639*  -0.0572  -0.0585 
 (1.7)  (1.7)  (1.5)  (1.6) 
 Ln  (Gain)  -0.9004*** 0.8920*** 1.0212***  1.0489***
 (2.6)  (2.6)  (2.9)  (3.0) 
 Ln  (Gain)  × Ln 1993 PCE  -0.1686** -0.1655** -0.2023***  -0.2099***
 (2.3)  (2.6)  (2.6)  (2.7) 
Community characteristics    
  Neighbors￿ net gain × 1,000  -0.1357 -0.1760  -0.2110  -0.2289 
 (1.1)  (1.4)  (1.6)  (1.6) 
Interactions        
 Ln  (Loss)  × (1) if large neighbor loss*  - -0.8959*  -1.0197*  -0.2919 
   (1.7)  (1.9)  (0.5) 
 Ln  (Loss)  × # 1993 groups  - -  0.8013  1.0153* 
     (1.5)  (1.8) 
 Ln  (Loss)  × (1) if neighbor loss × # 1993   - -  -  -2.3459** 
    group      (2.1) 
Constant -0.2134  -0.1474  -0.0124  0.0209 
 (0.5)  (0.4)  (0.0)  (0.1) 










F-test all covariates  
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Notes: Household fixed-effects estimates. Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. * indicates 
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In column 2 of Table 4, we consider the relationship between losses at the 
household and community levels. Our hypothesis is that households suffering a loss, the 
effect of that loss would be greater when they live in communities where their neighbors 
were suffering large losses at the same time, since local networks of support would be 
strained. After conditioning on the net community gain (derived by combining the 
neighbors￿ gains and losses for which there was little difference in Table 3), an 
interaction term between the household loss and a dummy variable representing those 
communities that had a large average neighbor loss shows that the damage to child 
nutritional status from household-level losses is exacerbated in communities that 
experienced large losses, consistent with the existence of informal sharing mechanisms.
11  
Next, we examine whether the relationship between household and community 
losses depends on the depth of existing linkages in the community. To explore this, we 
consider various interactions between own loss, neighbors￿ loss, and initial number of 
groups in 1993. The final specification in Table 4 shows the main findings. First, as with 
the other specifications in the table, at the household level the role of positive events 
appears to be robustly significant, though its effect is mitigated for wealthier households. 
Second, households that suffered a loss were better able to absorb it if they were in 
communities with a larger number of groups in 1993, consistent with the view that the 
latter is a proxy measure for social capital. Finally, this capacity is weakened in those 
                                                 
11 Large losses here are defined as greater than R450 per capita. When smaller losses were used, the effects 
are weakened substantially, suggesting that it takes relatively large losses for informal sharing to break 
down.   32
communities where the neighbor losses were very large; there is little evidence, then, of 
the bridging sort of social capital that would allow shocks to be absorbed across 
communities. All of these results hold when, in addition, we include an interaction with 
household loss and 1993 community average per capita expenditures, in order to ensure 
that we are not confounding social capital with wealth effects. Taken together, the results 
are consistent with households being better able to diversify away their idiosyncratic risk 
in communities that suffered smaller numbers of aggregate negative shocks or in 
communities where there appears to be more social capital. 
 
Robustness of the Results 
There are a number of potential estimation problems with these results. In this 
subsection we present evidence to demonstrate that they are not altering the results 
significantly. The concerns include (1) attrition in the sample, (2) the endogeneity of 
reported events and valuations of those events, and (3) measurement error in the reported 
values, including recall bias. 
Using data for the 1993 KIDS cohort, Alderman et al. (2001b) show that 
estimates of the height-for-age Z-scores of young children that account for attrition in the 
sample are not significantly different from those that do not. In the present work, the 
additional controls for household fixed-effects make it even less likely that attrition bias 
is driving the results. 
Regarding endogeneity and measurement error in the shock information, it is 
important to emphasize that because of the household fixed-effects, only time- or child-  33
varying factors are potentially problematic.
12 So if a household has an unchanging (and 
additive) ￿propensity￿ to suffer more shocks, for example, this would be controlled for in 
the estimation. 
As reported above, the present work included all types of shocks￿a strategy that 
might mute the possible endogeneity biases caused by selecting only a few. We also 
considered a set of specifications in which we excluded the death and illness shocks that 
we think are the most problematic. When we do this, all results hold with one exception, 
the triple interaction of household losses, neighbors￿ losses, and community groups in the 
final column of Table 4 is no longer significant. Finally, in order to assess the possibility 
that changes in community services such as the introduction of health clinics are 
confounding the results, we consider a set of specifications in which in addition to the 
neighbors￿ measures from the household survey, we also include the community-survey-
based shock measures. The results are unchanged.  
As described earlier, there is a danger that recall bias favors reporting of more 
recent events. For negative events this means that the average size of shocks is increasing 
over time. We also know that height-for-age Z-scores are improving over time. 
Therefore, even if there were residual reporting bias after controlling for age, the bias for 
negative shocks would be in the downward (toward zero) direction. It may, however, be 
the case that the role of gains is being overstated due to this problem. To explore this, we 
                                                 
12 While a potential remedy is instrumental variables estimation, due to the correlation among the various 
factors, this proved to be feasible to do only for household losses and gains on their own without also 
including the community shocks that allow us to assess the differential effects. In addition, even with very 
good instruments, it is unlikely that all the interactions could be successfully instrumented.   34
reestimate using only the more recent shock information from 1996 onward; the 
estimated effects on both gains and losses are very similar to those already reported, and 
no other results are significantly changed. 
A final concern is random measurement error in the event reports and valuations. 
Where we find significant effects, this is less critical to the extent we do not want to rely 
on the coefficient point estimates. Of more concern, however, is the measurement of the 
aggregate shocks (both from the household and community surveys), since the finding 
that they are not important factors may be related to this. In particular, a possible 
criticism of the approach we have taken is that the communities are not well defined 
geographically.  
On balance, then, while we would prefer not to make strong claims about the 
exact magnitudes of the estimated effects, it does not seem likely that the potential biases 
outlined above are substantially changing the qualitative results. 
 
5. Other Risk-Coping Mechanisms 
Households in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, live in an environment 
characterized by a variety of idiosyncratic and covariant risks, and many face significant 
probabilities of experiencing economic losses due to shocks that threaten their daily 
subsistence living standards. Before taking into account a measure of linkages or social 
capital within (and possibly across) communities, we find that idiosyncratic shocks 
appear to influence a key indicator of child nutritional status. The implication is that in   35
KwaZulu-Natal, unlike the idealized village community, some households seem unable to 
insure against such idiosyncratic risk. 
For those who reported a negative economic event, several additional questions 
around possible coping mechanisms used were asked. They included whether assets were 
sold (26 percent), insurance was used (6 percent), money was borrowed (4 percent), or 
children were taken out of school (1 percent). The question most relevant for this 
research, however, was whether the household received help from others: this sort of 
assistance accompanied 20 percent of the negative events, concentrated in a somewhat 
smaller group of households, 13 percent.  
Respondents were asked also about individuals who were economically linked to 
the household but were not household members, including individuals who might have 
been sending or receiving remittances, borrowing or lending land, etc. The household 
then reported whether it or anyone else would be able to provide assistance in an 
economic crisis. Forty percent of households were unable to identify any such person 
who could help; 40 percent, one such person; and the remainder, more than one person.  
That households in KwaZulu-Natal are operating in somewhat narrow networks 
resonates with the finding that some households are unable to cope with idiosyncratic 
risks. When aggregate shocks and a proxy measure for social capital are introduced, 
however, there is a partial rescue of the informal insurance model. Households in 
communities with large losses are less able to cope with their own loss, consistent with 
informal support mechanisms being strained. Furthermore, households in communities   36
with more groups, our proxy for social capital, are able to weather idiosyncratic shocks 
more easily.  
Investment decisions regarding the nutritional status of young children are only 
part of the typical households￿ portfolio of possible responses to adverse and favorable 
events. It may be that the findings reported here are the results of households behaving in 
a fashion to protect some other type of consumption or investment. Given its importance 
in the South African labor market and the extremely small number of households 
indicating they had coped with their loss by taking a child out of school, a likely 
candidate is education. Future work might focus on determining what other aspects of the 
household economy are being protected in the potentially dangerous trade-off with child 
health. 
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